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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA-A (M) (20 Jan 71) FOR OT UT 703070

25 January 1971

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)**

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH SQUADRON, 1ST AIR CAVALRY  
APO San Francisco, 96357

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 7th Squadron  
1st Air Cavalry, for the period ending 31 July 1970  
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

15 August 1970

CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPCP-DT, APO 96553  
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCD-DST, APO 96375  
CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBAGC-O, APO 96334  
CO, 164th GP, ATTN: S-3, APO 96215

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

A. During this reporting period, the Squadron continued support of the Republic of Vietnam within IV Corps Tactical Zone and the southern provinces of Cambodia. Task Force Blackhawk supported the 44th Special Tactical Zone, and on 16 July 1970 was also assigned support of the 9th ARVN Division. The composition of the Task Force organization has proved flexible and responsive to the assigned missions as can be seen in section H (11) of this report. The 2nd section, 1st Platoon, 221st RAC was replaced by aircraft from the 199th to facilitate Task Force reporting and control. On 9 July 1970, the FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) New Equipment Test Team (NETT) was assigned to the Squadron for a 30 day test and evaluation period.

B. (U) The only change to unit organization is the addition of the 53rd QM Det on 20 June 1970. Organization chart and station listings are shown on inclosure #1.

C. (U) Changes in Command and Staff:

(1) MAJ William R. Rittenhouse, 233-60-9861, IN, assumed duties as Squadron Executive Officer from MAJ Walter E. Kidwell, 226-42-3622, AR, on 2 June 1970.

(2) MAJ Joseph K. Hodges, 306-34-2520, IN, assumed duties as Squadron Executive Officer from MAJ William R. Rittenhouse, 233-60-9861, IN, on 15 July 1970.

(3) MAJ Ronald A. Schwachenwald, 284-30-7958, AR, assumed duties as Squadron S-3 from MAJ William R. Rittenhouse, 233-60-9861, IN, on 1 Jun 70.

(4) CPT James H. Evans, 499-48-5672, GE, assumed duties as Squadron S-3 from MAJ Ronald A. Schwachenwald, 284-30-7958, AR, on 21 June 1970.

(5) MAJ James F. Hughes, 254-46-1983, IN, assumed duties as Squadron S-3 from CPT James H. Evans, 499-48-5672, GE, on 26 July 1970.

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(6) MAJ Keric J. Cochran, 569-34-8544, assumed duties as Squadron Chaplain from CPT Daniel J. Donahue, 028-24-8993 on 20 July 1970.

(7) CPT Colin B. Casrove, 002-30-1014, FA, assumed duties as Squadron Signal Officer from 1LT John T. Meredith, 379-44-1094, SC, on 21 July 70.

(8) 1LT Larry R. Kolar, 408-64-1672, TC, assumed duties as Squadron Maintenance Officer from CPT Robert H. Black, 286-30-9182, TC, on 13 May 70.

(9) CPT William J. Staffa, 054-24-058, FA, assumed command of Troop A from MAJ Stanley E. Scott, 492-40-2969, AR, 24 July 1970.

(10) MAJ Raymond D. Stickman, 508-54-0896, AR, assumed command of Troop C from MAJ Allan L. Smith, 451-66-4171, AR, 13 May 1970.

(11) MAJ Johnny A. Phillips, 256-48-8518, AR, assumed command of Troop D, 3/5 from MAJ Dolmer H. Livingston, 234-60-4326, AR, on 21 July 1970.

D. (C) (1) Unit Strength as of 31 July 1970: (Military)

UNIT	OFFICERS			WO			EM		TOTAL	
	AUTH/	PRA/	OH	AUTH/	PRA/	OH	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH
HEMT	23	22	16	7	7	13	181	192	211	221
A Trp	18	16	16	30	28	25	121	98	169	139
370 TC Det	1	1	1	1	1	1	54	53	56	55
819 Sig Det	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	6	6	7
B Trp	18	16	14	30	28	26	121	95	169	135
574 TC Det	1	1	1	1	1	0	54	52	56	53
811 Sig	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	5	6	5
C Trp	18	16	14	30	28	23	121	105	169	142
371st TC	1	1	1	1	1	1	54	51	56	53
3d Sig Det	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	6	6	7
D Trp, 7/1st	5	5	3	0	0	0	127	131	132	134
D Trp, 3/5th	16	14	15	34	31	25	308	185	258	225
82nd Mod	1	1	1	0	0	0	7	7	8	8
261st RAD	0	0	0	1	1	1	8	7	9	8
53rd OH Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	15	8	15
	102	93	82	138	129	117	1079	1008	1319	1207

D. (U) (2) Unit Strength as of 31 July 1970: (Civilians)

UNIT	TECH REPS		U.S. CIV		V.N. CIV		3d NAT	
	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH
HEMT	0	4	0	0	8	8	0	0
A Trp	0	0	0	2	5	5	0	0
B Trp	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0
C Trp	0	0	0	2	5	5	0	0
D Trp, 7/1	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0

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D. (U) (2) Unit Strength as of 31 July 1970: (Civilians) (Continued)

UNIT	TECH REPS		U.S. CIV		V.R. CIV		3d NAT	
	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH
D Trp, 3/5th	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0
83rd Med	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
261st Rad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
53rd CM Det	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

E. (C) Aircraft Authorized/On Hand as of 31 July 1970:

UNIT	UH-1H		AH-1G		OH-6A		TOTAL	
	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH	AUTH/	OH
H&HT	7	5	0	0	0	0	7	5
A Trp	8	8	9	8	10	10	27	26
B Trp	8	8	9	9	10	10	27	27
C Trp	8	8	9	8	10	10	27	26
D Trp, 3/5	8	8	9	8	9	9	26	25
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>109</b>

F. (C) Operational Statistics (See Inclosures #2 and #3)

G. (U) Squadron Awards and Decorations:

AWARD	RECOMM'D	APPROVED	DOWN-GRADED	UP-GRADED	RMKS	PENDING
DSC	0	0	0	0		
SS	14	12	0	0	Impact(8)	5
IM	1	0	0	0	Maj Kidwell	1
DFC	52	65	3*	1*	Impact (13)	25
SM	0	0	0	0		0
ES/V	2	18	0	0		0
ES/S	71	92	0	0		4
IS/A	30	21	1*	0		2
AM/V	42	69	0	3*		27
AM	188	267	0	0		25
ACM/V	19	34	0	0		3
ACM/S	213	287	0	0		6
ACM/A	173	188	0	0		6
PH	4	21	0	0		4
CID	34	48	0	0		21
GMT	3	0	0	0		3
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>852</b>	<b>1122</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>132</b>

- NOTE (\*)
- |                            |                               |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. 1 DFC upgraded to SS    | 4. 3 DFC downgraded to AM/V   |
| 2. 2 AM/V upgraded to DFC  | 5. 1 IS/A downgraded to ACM/A |
| 3. 1 AM/V upgraded to ES/V |                               |



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### H. (C) Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the Squadron was instrumental in the success enjoyed by the IV ARVN Corps in Cambodia. The air elements of the Squadron established numerous enemy contacts, supported innumerable ground actions, and located many caches throughout this period. The 7/1 Cav participated in 4 major Cambodian operations. Each of these thrusts was directed into former NVA sanctuaries. All elements of the Squadron, including the ground cavalry troop, were deployed during these operations. After the termination of operations outside the IV Corps Tactical Zone, the Squadron normally deployed only 3 air cavalry troops for the remainder of this reporting period. This was done to permit the completion of maintenance that had been delayed or deferred during the 29 April-30 June 70 Cambodian operation. The ground cavalry troop provided continuous escort of fuel and ammunition convoys to permit resupply of forward stagefields along the Cambodian border. Elements of the ground troop also provided security for the 164th Group forward CP during this period. D Troop further maintained a high level of patrol and ambush activity within the Vinh Long Airfield sensitive zone, with good results. The Cambodian operations greatly disrupted enemy activity within IV Corps, as indicated by a 75% reduction in enemy initiated incidents and decreased enemy contacts by the Squadron during July.

(2) On 1 May 1970, D Troop, 3/5 Cav continued to support the drive of the 9th ARVN Div into the Crow's Nest area of Cambodia. Contact was considerably less than that of the day before, but the air elements were able to account for 4 enemy KBA and 10 structures, while supporting ground troops in contact via WT9714 and XT1340. This brought the D Troop, 3/5 total claims for the operation to 69 KBA. The operation also identified D Troop, 3/5 as the first U.S. Army Aviation unit to officially cross the Cambodian border for combat operations.

(3) Action in the Cambodian operation shifted from the Crow's Nest to the Parrot's Beak area on 2 May 1970. While supporting the ARVN armored thrust, A Troop was credited with the highest daily body count ever recorded by a company size aviation unit in IV Corps. Sweeping the area ahead of the APC's, A Troop scouts and guns accounted for 170 KBA. On 3 May 70, C Troop continued to support operations in the same area and was credited with an additional 13 KBA.

(4) During the morning of 7 May 70 while performing an armed visual reconnaissance in support of the 44th STZ forward CP (VS766471), scout elements of A Troop were credited with 7 KBA.

(5) While conducting a visual reconnaissance mission on 8 May 70, an O-1 "Bird Dog" of the 199th RAC spotted a large number of armed VC moving through the area (WT475130). B Troop reacted to the sighting and was credited with 40 KBA.

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(6) The second IV Corps allied offensive operation into Cambodia, **Quu Long I**, began on 9 May 1970. All the assets of the 7/1st ACS were committed to the support of the Vietnamese army, navy and marine forces. The Squadron Headquarters established a forward base of operations at **Don Phuoc (WT518009)**. The 164th CAG forward CP was established at **An Long (WS428822)** and secured by D Troop, 7/1. All the lift elements of the squadron were consolidated under A Troop and used to bring in ground forces to secure an ARVN fire base early in the morning of D-Day. A Troop was also used as a reserve reaction force and accounted for 9 KBA in that role. B Troop was used to screen in front of advancing armored columns, as they pushed northward in search of Military Region II Headquarters. Enemy contacts resulted in 39 KBA. Later in the day, B Troop located two cache sites (WT2750) that yielded a large amount of mixed ammunition and 150 weapons. C Troop was responsible for reconnaissance of landing zones and covering the insertion of ARVN troops, who were to secure the **Neak Luong Ferry (WT1144)**. Ground troops successfully occupied the ferry crossing with C Troop elements receiving credit for 17 KBA. During the course of the day, D Troop, 3/5 Cav, in search of the 88th NVA Regiment, engaged several pockets of enemy resistance and received credit for 40 KBA and one 2 1/2 ton vehicle destroyed. On the 10th of May 70, the Squadron continued in support of operation **Quu Long I** by providing 3 air cavalry troops. A Troop accounted for 4 KBA (WT272247). B Troop accounted for 24 KBA. C Troop had negative enemy personnel claims but were successful in uncovering an enemy cache (WT6218) which yielded over 2 tons of medical supplies. On 11 May 1970, 7/1st Air Cav again provided 3 air cavalry troops in support of operation **Quu Long I**, as aggressive ground units continued to seek out enemy units and cache sites. Elements of the 4th Ranger Group (ARVN), developed a heavy contact with an estimated enemy battalion (WT655285). D Troop, 3/5 Cav was called in to support the contact and provide continuous aerial weapons fire, enabling the Rangers to overrun the enemy positions. After the battle, 121 enemy bodies were counted. Troop D, 3/5 Cav was credited with 61 KBA. During the course of the day, A Troop located caches (WT255347 and WT230314) yielding over 5 tons of weapons and assorted ammunition. B Troop located a cache (WT318272) which produced 8 BAR's, 3-37mm AA weapons, 3-12.7mm AA weapons, 8-60mm mortars, 7-82mm mortars, 220 SKS rifles, 34 AK-47's and a large amount of assorted ammunition. Only 2 of the 3 air cav troops supporting operations on 12 May 1970 reported significant activity. A Troop destroyed an enemy POL dump (WT5528) and was credited with 9 KBA. D Troop, 3/5 inserted VI Marines (WT5334) and accounted for 2 KBA. Activity among units participating in **Quu Long I** was light until the late afternoon of 14 May 70 at which time B Troop established contact with a large enemy unit via (WT4444). VI Marines were inserted to develop the situation. U.S. Navy UH-1C's and OV-10's provided additional air support throughout the night. Results of the combined air strikes were 15 KBA.

(7) Operation **Quu Long**, Phase II began on 17 May 1970 with 7/1 Air Cav elements supporting the allied push against the enemy held areas of southern Cambodia. One air cav troop was assigned to support each of

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3 Task Forces formed by the 9th ARVN Division, 21st ARVN Division and the 44th STZ. While working with the 21st ARVN Div, Troop D, 3/5 Cav developed a heavy contact (WS430665) which resulted in 34 KBA. A Troop supported the 9th ARVN Div in operations against a known VC stronghold, (VT8010). After accounting for 2 KBA while inserting 9th Div troops, A Troop elements engaged an enemy contact that produced 20 KBA as well as 46 structures, 5 tractors, a 5 ton tractor, a 5 ton truck, and 2000 gallons of POL destroyed. Later in the day, C Troop reacted to an intelligence report of an enemy headquarters location. Scout elements established contact and destroyed 12 sampans and accounted for 2 KBA (WT028299). One hundred eighty ground troops were inserted into the contact area and immediately discovered a large enemy cache. The cache yielded 20 automatic weapons, 3-51 cal machine guns, 1 Browning water cooled machine gun, 2-7.62mm machine guns, 1-82mm mortar, 5-60mm mortars, 1 H-1 radio, 2 TA-312 and KEB telephones, 3-50mm French artillery pieces, and 2 tons of assorted ammunition. B Troop also supported the 44th STZ and had a total of 5 KBA (WT771250). A visual reconnaissance mission by D Troop, 3/5 on 18 May 1970 (WS5673) resulted in the discovery of an enemy communications facility which yielded numerous tools and 3,000,000 picosters in NLF notes. The most significant results for the day was turned in by A Troop. Contact was established with an estimated VC company after reacting to an intelligence report (WS764648). Final results were 62 KBA and 38 structures destroyed. On 19 May 1970, A Troop continued support of the 9th ARVN Div by reacting to sporadic contacts at four different locations. Total results for the day's activity were 26 KBA and 20 structures destroyed. As Operation Chu Long II drew to a close, C Troop, operating in support of the 44th STZ produced the day's most significant results. Elements were credited with 30 KBA and the capture of 3-51 cal machine guns and 1-30 cal machine gun. During the course of operation Chu Long Phase II, D Troop, 7/1 provided convoy support for POL resupply between Binh Thuy and Ha Tien. Troop D, 7/1 escorted 5 consecutive convoys from the staging area at Rach Gia between 15 May - 21 May 70.

(8) On 20 May 70, C Troop supported the 3rd Flt of D Troop, 7/1 in an operation to recover the bodies of two B Troop crewmembers who had been shot down into Cambodian territory on 11 Feb 70. Upon insertion (WT775191), D Troop, 7/1 elements received heavy fire from structures and bunkers in the vicinity. Suppressive fire produced 5 enemy KIA and 2 KBA. After clearing the LZ, the 3rd Flt continued to their objective and successfully recovered the bodies of their downed comrades.

(9) While working for Special Forces Detachment B-41 on 30 May 70, C Troop elements supported ground troops in contact, (XT1902). C Troop reconnoitered in front of the advancing ground troops pushing toward a suspected enemy cache. During this time, scout and gun elements accounted for 10 KBA. The cache site yielded 11-105mm rounds, 15-1 KG-AP mines, 34 AK-47 rifles, 3-60mm mortars, 1 typewriter, 2 sewing machines, 39 new sampans, 15-107mm rockets, 200 AK magazines, 160 gals of fuel, 30 gals of oil, and 1 gas welder.

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(10) On 2 June 1970 while supporting the 44th STZ, A Troop established contact with a company size enemy unit (WS763609). Elements supported the ground troops with aerial weapons fire, producing 13 KBA. The ground troops reported killing 10 enemy and capturing 1 POW, 2 AK-47 rifles, 1-60mm mortar, 1 BAR, 1 M-1 carbine, and 8 Russian rifles.

(11) The flexibility of the Task Force concept was amply demonstrated by operations on 4 June 1970. Task Force Blackhawk consisted of 2 air cavalry troops, 2 assault helicopter companies, and 1 assault helicopter support company. These assets were utilized to airlift the 4th Ranger Group into 3 landing zones, provide reconnaissance in zone, and establish a fire support base. OH-47 and OH-54 assets were used to lift 105mm and 155mm artillery pieces into the fire support base and were under the control of the Task Force.

(12) A Troop worked with elements of the 21st ARVN Div on 6 Jun 70. While on a visual reconnaissance (WR6160), elements received enemy fire. Return fire resulted in 8 enemy KBA, 9 structures, and 4 sampans destroyed.

(13) On 13 June 1970, B Troop supported the 21st ARVN Div with a visual reconnaissance and received heavy enemy automatic weapons fire via WR165412. Cobra strikes into the area produced 7 enemy KBA.

(14) Elements of D Troop, 3/5 Cav, working for the 7th ARVN Div, established contact with an enemy element while performing a visual reconnaissance (WS2241). Cobra strikes into the area resulted in 8 KBA, 3 structures, and 3 sampans being destroyed. D Troop, 3/5 Cav lift elements then inserted 120 troops into the contact area to further develop the situation.

(15) On 15 June 70, D Troop, 3/5 again worked in support of the 7th ARVN Div. While performing routine visual reconnaissance, D Troop, 3/5 established contact with an enemy unit (WS0750). As lift elements inserted 52 troops into the contact area, cobra gunships put in strikes which resulted in 30 KBA and 7 structures being destroyed. D Troop, 3/5 elements continued the contact on 16 Jun 70 by inserting 256 troops. Cobra strikes throughout the contact for that day accounted for an additional 11 KBA, 14 structures and 22 sampans destroyed (WS0352).

(16) A visual reconnaissance conducted by A Troop on 18 June 70 resulted in a contact with an unknown size enemy element. Five KBA, 2 structures, and 1 sampan were credited to the "Apache's". Ground troops were inserted by lift elements to further develop the situation and accounted for an additional 4 VC KIA.

(17) B Troop elements conducted a visual reconnaissance in support of the 21st ARVN Div and engaged a small VC force, (WRC74041) killing 6 of the enemy. Ground troops inserted by B Troop lift elements captured several VC documents.

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(18) On 20 Jun 70, D Troop, 3/5 supported the 10th Regiment, 7th ARVN Div for operations in northern Kien Hoa Province. Contact was established with the 263rd VC Main Force Battalion (XS6331). D Troop, 3/5 Cobras put in strikes in support of the ground troops and produced 26 enemy KBA. Ground troops accounted for an additional 50 KIA and 1 POW, as well as capturing 2-51 cal AA machine guns, 2-30 cal light machine guns, 1-60mm mortar, 13 AK-47 rifles, 1 M-16 rifle, 1 M-79 GL, 1-CAC rifle, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 1 Chicom pistol and assorted ammunition.

(19) While working for the 9th ARVN Div on 21 June 70 in the Ha Tien area, A Troop was responsible for turning up a significant enemy weapons cache. (WS495775) A Troop scouts discovered a suspected enemy cache site. The lift elements inserted troops near the site. Sixty-two small arms and assorted ammunition were found. A Troop continued their reconnaissance in the immediate area, and discovered additional cache sites. Subsequent ground operations in the area produced in excess of 2,000 small arms, as well as a number of assorted crew served weapons and ammunition.

(20) On 29 June 70, D Troop, 3/5 Cav dealt the communications element of the headquarters of Military Region II (NVA) a severe blow. While on a visual reconnaissance in reaction to an intelligence report, D Troop, 3/5 Cav scouts located a number of radio antennas protruding from the trees (WT 1631). The scouts were immediately engaged by enemy fire. Return fire resulted in 11 enemy KBA. Insertion of ground forces produced 4 more KIA, and 6 POW's. The most important result though was the capture of 8 high-frequency, single side band radios, most of which were operating at the time of capture, and 50 pounds of documents.

(21) Operations in support of the 4th Ranger Battalion during the morning of 30 June 70 produced 8 KBA's and 165 gals of POL destroyed (WQ2900) by G Troop elements. That same afternoon, G Troop supported the 33rd Regt, 21st ARVN Div with a visual reconnaissance and were credited with 7 KBA, 14 structures, and 8 sampans destroyed at various locations.

(22) On 5 July 1970, A Troop supported the 7th ARVN Division. The scouts drew fire from enemy positions in the vicinity of XS340473. Elements quickly returned the fire killing 14 enemy in the ensuing contact. Three structures and six sampans were destroyed in the air strikes, along with one anti-aircraft machine gun and one AK-47.

(23) On 5 July 1970, B Troop made contact with enemy elements (WR4158) while in support of the 21st ARVN Division. The enemy was attempting to cross an open area, when they were engaged with by Cobras and LOH's. The contact resulted in 9 KBA and 3 sampans destroyed.

(24) On the night of 8 July 1970, D Troop, 7/1, initiated an ambush (WS923283) against two sampans loaded with enemy personnel. Five VC were confirmed KIA. One SKS and two M-1 carbines were captured along with several booby traps and tools used to install the booby traps.

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(25) A Troop supported the 7th ARVN Division on 13 July 1970 and contact was established (WS9550). The contact lasted all day, and 463 troops were inserted into the area. A Troop was credited with 10 KBA, 1 structure, and 8 sampans destroyed. The ground troops action produced 1 POW, 8 AK-47's, 1 SKS, and 1 CHICOM AR captured.

(26) C Troop, while in support of the 9th ARVN Division, on 19 Jul 70 established contact with enemy elements in the Tra Tien Forest (WS6444). The enemy at first tried to evade but finally fired on the scouts who immediately engaged the enemy. The contact resulted in 12 enemy KBA, 3 AK-47's, and 200 rounds of ammo and various equipment captured by inserted ground troops.

(27) On the night of 18 July 70, D Troop, 7/1 initiated two separate ambushes on VC elements at co-ordinates WS978269 and WS953260. The ambushes resulted in 7 enemy KIA, 2 sampans destroyed, and 2 M-16's captured.

(28) D Troop, 7/1 executed two separate ambushes against VC elements on 19 Jul 1970 in the Vinh Long Army Airfield area. The results were six enemy KIA, one M-16 captured, and two sampans destroyed. The KIA count was believed to be much higher since many more VC were believed hit in the ambushes. However, the enemy had completely policed the ambush sites by first light, and daylight sweeps through the area yielded nothing.

(29) On 21 July, C Troop was working in support of the 9th ARVN Division at Ben Tre and supporting ground troops in contact (XS5622). Despite heavy enemy ground fire, C Troop gunships conducted numerous air strikes in support of the ground troops. During the course of the contact, C Troop received credit for 13 KBA.

(30) D Troop, 7/1 killed four enemy soldiers during the execution of an ambush (WS955260) on 23 Jul 70.

(31) On 29 July, D Troop, 3/5 made contact with an estimated reinforced VC platoon in the vicinity of WBS577. Elements were credited with 6 KBA, 25 structures, and 6 sampans destroyed.

(32) On 23 Jul 70, FLIR conducted night operations in Kien Phong Province (Base Area 470) supported by the 162nd/114th Night Hunter/Killer packages. At 0250 hours 40 VC were detected at WS924501. Gun strikes were placed on the target resulting in 17 VC KBA. Attacking gunships received light ground fire with negative damage.

(33) D Troop, 7/1 conducted a "Combined Watch" operation on 23 July 1970 with Popular Forces personnel from Duc Ton District, Sa Dec Province. One ambush site (WS955260) consisting of 9 US and 20 VN made contact with an estimated VC squad at 2345 hours. At 2400 hours a sweep of the contact area was made confirming 4 VC KIA. During the course of the sweep, elements began receiving small arms fire from a nearby tree line. Cobra strikes were placed on the area with unknown results.

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(34) FLIR conducted night operations on 24 Jul 70 in Duc Ton District, Sa Dec Province (NS940245). Results of the mission were 6 KBA and 2 sampans destroyed.

(35) On 29 Jul 70, B Troop supporting B-41 conducted preplanned insertions (NS9371). Ground troops made contact shortly after insertions (NS928708). Additional elements were inserted to reinforce. Results were 2 VC KBA and 2 structures destroyed by supporting aircraft. Ground troops killed 6 VC, captured 2 M-60 machine guns, several AK-47 magazines, and some food and clothing while suffering 5 ARVN MIA. Enemy elements were believed to be from the 504th VC Battalion.

(36) A total of 92 operational days for the Squadron comprised this reporting period.

### I. (C) Airfield Defense Activities.

(1) Vinh Long Army Airfield experienced two indirect fire attacks during the reporting period, both of which resulted in more damage to equipment and facilities and more personnel casualties than any attack in the previous year. Last-Light Reconnaissance missions continue to produce results. Night ambushes by the infantry platoons of the air cavalry troops and D Troop, 7/1 combined with local RF forces have unquestionably enhanced airfield security. The most productive month of the reporting period was July in which fifty percent of D Troop ambushes made contact with the enemy, resulting in 17 confirmed kills and 13 probable kills. Improvements have been made on the airfield perimeter by rebuilding/refurbishing bunkers and towers and replacing claymore mines and wire obstacles where needed. Plans have been made to emplace eight-foot cyclone fence around the perimeter bunkers. This will provide a greater degree of protection against rocket propelled grenades and sapper/ground attack.

(2) The airfield was subjected to an indirect fire attack at 0030 hours on 1 May 70. The attack consisted of 45 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 7 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, which inflicted heavy damage to 10 aircraft and light damage to 20 aircraft. Night security aircraft observed two flashes from mortars, west and southwest of the airfield, but were unable to pinpoint and engage them due to the close proximity of friendly troops and uncertainty of exact locations of flashes. After five minutes the enemy ceased fire and withdrew southwest. Two 60mm mortars and one 82mm mortar were used in the attack. A significant aspect of this attack was the enemy's use of the 82mm mortar in an attack against the airfield for the first time in more than a year.

(3) For the second time during the reporting period the enemy used 82mm mortar fire in an indirect fire attack at 0105 hours on 28 July 70. Eighteen rounds were fired which inflicted light damage to one aircraft and three buildings, wounding six U.S. personnel. Night security aircraft were airborne but were unable to detect the mortar position. Enemy ceased fire after three minutes and withdrew in an unknown direction.

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### J. (U) Weather:

Adverse weather has had only a very limited effect on operations during this reporting period. Ground fog has delayed the reporting time for a few missions. At times isolated thunderstorms have caused the mission to be shifted to a secondary area of operation or delayed for a period of time. All major operations conducted by the Squadron have been planned utilizing the available weather forecasts.

### 2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

A. (U) Personnel: None

B. (U) Intelligence: None

C. (U) Operations:

(1) Observation: The PD ammunition for the XM-35 (20mm) system is not effective against most acquired targets.

(2) Evaluation: On a typical visual reconnaissance, most enemy contacts are made along wooded canal lines, in bunkered areas, or areas with prepared fighting positions. The PD ammunition for the XM-35 has had limited effect on these targets.

(3) Recommendation:

Every effort should be made to obtain armor piercing rounds for the XM-35 (20mm) system. In order to properly evaluate the weapon and obtain optimum results AP ammunition is needed.

(4) Command Action: Requests are being made to obtain AP ammunition. Also, reports are submitted to Group as required on the evaluation of the XM-35 system.

D. (U) Organization: None

E. (U) Training:

(1) Observation: Past experience with new scout pilots has pointed out a need for a more thorough and systematic scout pilot orientation.

(2) Evaluation: The Aero-Scout platoon requires a continuous influx of pilots. Since many of these aviators are unfamiliar with the Air Cavalry operation and OH-6A aircraft, a comprehensive training program is being developed in the Troops of the Squadron.



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(3) Recommendations: To accommodate both the newly assigned aviator and the transitioned aviator, the following training program has been adopted in the Squadron:

- a. 50 hours flight time UH-1H
- b. 50 hours flight time AH-1G as co-pilot
- c. Completion of OH-6A transition at unit level or at the Transition School
- d. 10 hours flight time as an observer in the OH-6A
- e. 10 hours flight as a pilot with an experienced scout pilot as the observer.
- f. Final check ride in the A0 with an IP as the observer

(4) Command Action: The Squadron has adopted this program in an effort to increase the effectiveness of the scout pilots.

F. (U) Logistics: None

G. (U) Communications:

(1) Observation: The power output of radio sets, AN/VRC-49 and AN/GRC-125 is believed to be lower than that published by the TM.

(2) Evaluation: Each radio set was connected to the RC-292 antennae. After replacing the antennae and antennae elements with new equipment and a check of the RF cables, the power output was still found to be low. Since the antennae was secured to a telephone pole, a grounding cable was installed. It was found that by doing this the power output of the radio sets increased by an average of 3.25 watts over the frequency spectrum.

(3) Recommendation: It is recommended that all RC-292's be grounded to increase the efficiency.

(4) Command Action: Squadron Commo has grounded all RC-292's being utilized in the Squadron.

H. (U) Material:

(1) Observation: Prior to 1 June 1970 the fairing assembly that encloses the XM-27 minigun system on the OH-6A had not been used. As a result numerous malfunctions occurred due to foreign matter accumulating in the weapons system.

(2) Evaluation: The use of this fairing assembly significantly increased the combat effectiveness of the minigun by eliminating many of the factors

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causing the malfunctions.

(3) Recommendations: It should be brought to the attention of all unit commanders, using the OH-6A as a reconnaissance aircraft, that the fairing assembly on the XM-27 can reduce the possibility of frequent malfunctions in this weapon.

(4) Command Action: All Troops in the Squadron have been notified of the increased effectiveness of the XM-27 through use of the fairing assembly.

3 Incl



JOHN W. WOODMANSON JR.  
LTC, ARMOR  
Commanding

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
AVBACE-C (15 Aug 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7/1st Air Cavalry Squadron  
for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, 164th Aviation Group (Combat), APO 96215

20 Aug 1970

Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSFOR  
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBACC-O, APO 96384

1. (U) The attached 7/1st ACS ORLL for period ending 31 July 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters.
2. (U) The following comments are made on the report: Para 2, pages 11 thru 13 concur with comments.

  
Colonel, in  
Commanding

AVBAGC-0 (15 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7/1st Air Cavalry Squadron  
for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 19 SEP 1970


TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-DST, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comment is considered pertinent:

Paragraph 2b(1), page 12, addresses the requirement to ground the RC-292 antenna. Concur. For proper orientation and maximum power transfer, the antenna modified ground plane RC-292 must be grounded. The normal ground path is through the metal mast section. Antennas mounted on non-conductive poles must have a ground cable to provide proper path to ground and provide adequate protection to equipment and operator from electrical storms.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
R. L. STROHECKER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

AVHDO-DO (15 Aug 70) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 7th Squadron  
1st Air Cavalry, for the period ending 31 July 1970  
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

18 OCT 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558


1. The Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron 1st Air Cavalry and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Operations," page 11, paragraph 2c: nonconcur. Tests on 20mm Armor Piercing Ammunition as reported by MUOCOM representatives show that the AP round is not bunker defeating. Ten and seventeen pound warhead HE 2.75" rockets will defeat most bunkers provided a direct hit is achieved. The 20mm XM35 system is intended to defeat personnel or "soft" materiel targets. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Material," page 12, paragraph 2h. This Headquarters has no evidence to believe the XM 27E1 system is widely used without the fairing assembly. The fairing assembly protects the M134 housing and gun drive assembly from foreign-object damage as well as making the system aerodynamically compatible with the airframe. Discussion of the use of the fairing assembly will be a subject in the October USARV Aviation Armament Conference. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1st Avn Bde  
7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

GPOP-DT (15 Aug 70) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 NOV 1970


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L. M. OLAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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Attached Units  
 Attached for Maint and log only  
 All units located at Vinh Long, RVN, APO 96357

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Inclosure # 1

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7/1 ACS OPERATIONAL STATISTICS  
 QUARTER ENDING 31 JULY 1970 (C)

SUB UNIT	SORTIES FLOW	TROOPS LIFTED	CARGO (TONS) LIFTED	ENEMY KIA	ENEMY POW	STRUCTURE/BUNKERS DESTROYED	SAMFAN DEST	AIRCRAFT LOSS	AIRCRAFT DAMAGED
EAHT	2,928	-	56.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
A Trp	11,280	9,908	34.7	397	6	589	320	3	28
B Trp	14,525	8,567	19.5	178	16	320	214	4	13
C Trp	12,941	10,533	95.7	168	10	506	292	4	24
D 7/1	-	-	-	-	-	420	9	-	-
D 3/5	6,480	12,103	46.0	291	11	482	464	8	20
TOTAL	50,154	41,111	248.3	1,034	43	2,317	1,299	19	85

EAHT Aircraft Loss: None Aircraft Damaged: None

A Trp Aircraft Loss: 3 OH-6A Aircraft Damaged: 5 UH-1H; 13 OH-6A; 10 AH-1G

B Trp Aircraft Loss: 4 OH-6A Aircraft Damaged: 4 UH-1H; 7 OH-6A; 2 AH-1G

C Trp Aircraft Loss: 2 OH-6A; 2 UH-1H Aircraft Damaged: 7 UH-1H; 11 OH-6A; 6 AH-1G

D 3/5 Aircraft Loss: 4 OH-6A; 2 UH-1H; 2 AH-1G Aircraft Damaged: 7 UH-1H; 6 OH-6A; 8 AH-1G

Inclosure # 2

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7/1 ACS OPERATIONAL STATISTICS (Cont'd)  
QUARTER ENDING 31 July 1970 (C)

Inclosure # 3

The following list of enemy weapons and equipment was captured through the combined effort of the Squadron and ARVN ground troops.

AK-47	132
SKS	2288
M-16	4
BAR	12
M-1 Carbine	3
M-2 Carbine	7
Assorted Rifles	138
MG 50 cal.	1
MG 12.7mm	11
Light Machine Gun	18
Automatic Weapons	20
AA 37mm	3
Recoilless Rifle 57mm	5
Recoilless Rifle 75mm	2
B-40 Rocket Launcher	11
M-79 Grenade Launcher	2
Mortar, 60mm	19
Mortar, 82mm	10
Mortar tubes, 122mm	5 cases
Mortar rounds, 60mm	25
Mortar rounds, 82mm	14
Recoilless Rifle rounds, 107mm	15
Grenades	120
Claymore mines	8
Assorted ammunition	7.5 Tons
Single-side Band HF radios	8
Radios	6
TA 312 & EEE Telephones	2
Chicom telephone	2
Chicom switchboard	1
Code Books	2
Documents	10 Kilos
Arc Welder	1
Sewing Machine	2
Generator 1.5 KW	1
Tractors	5
Vehicles	4
Medical Supplies	2 Tons
Explosives	1500 Pounds
Fuel	2160 Gallons
Oil	30 Gallons
AP Mines	12
Ordnance Repair Equipment	400 Pounds
Engines 5 HP	1
Sumpen Motors	9

UNCLASSIFIED

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